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rivate sector investment is the main culprit in the
weak U.S. recovery following the Great Recession
of 2007-09. The left chart below displays the trends
in private investment and consumption since 1995 after
adjusting for the effects of inflation. Consumption expen-
ditures have actually surpassed their previous peak levels
of 2007 and are therefore higher than ever. Government
expenditure and net exports (not shown) display similar
trends. Investment is the only component of gross domes-
tic product (GDP) that has not yet recovered. Currently, it
stands 20 percent below its peak level of 2006. This means
investment is contributing negatively to GDP growth by
3.2 percentage points (the investment component repre-
sents about 16 percent of total GDP). 
The right chart focuses on the individual components
of private investment. According to the data, the low levels
of investment are accounted for by a continuous decline in
investment in structures (residential and nonresidential).
The only other component of investment—equipment and
software—is already above its previous peak level.
What economic factors explain the depressed behavior
of residential structure investment? Many commentators
have suggested that real estate prices during 2000-06 were
driven by unreasonably low risk premia or too-optimistic
expectations. Asset prices during this period, including
the market valuations of existing and newly constructed
houses, plus many nonresidential structures, might have
been too high. Namely, there was a bubble in real estate
prices. Events such as the failure of Lehman Brothers,
caused by a bet on further increases in the already “high”
prices of commercial real estate that did not materialize,
led to revised expectations. House prices started to fall and
some existing homeowners were forced (perhaps because
of illness or job loss) to sell or move into foreclosure. A
self-fulfilling burst in home values materialized.
As the real estate bubble burst, the U.S. economy found
itself with a stock of residential and nonresidential struc-
tures higher than desired. Under these conditions, economic
theory predicts investment in structures should collapse
(just as observed in the data) and stay low until the desired
level is attained (either by natural depreciation or by actively
restructuring the housing stock to more desirable uses).
Moreover, this adjustment process is expected to be slow,
given the relatively low rate of depreciation of residential
and nonresidential structures.
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NOTE: All values shown on the charts are in log units.The current slow economic recovery may therefore be,
at least in part, the natural result of the burst of the real
estate bubble. Further research is required to determine
what role monetary policy can play under these circum-
stances. ■
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